Non-Class Group Litigation Under EU and German Law by Koch, Harald
KOCH.DOC 08/06/01 1:33 PM
355
NON-CLASS GROUP LITIGATION UNDER EU
AND GERMAN LAW
HARALD KOCH*
In his contribution, Professor Walter described the basic obsta-
cles to American-style class litigation in continental European civil
law systems.1  This Article will discuss what European Union and
German law does—or might do—to surmount these obstacles.2  First,
I will sketch the two basic models of collective interest representation
in European procedure (“European procedure” meaning civil proce-
dure in different European legal systems and the impact of European
law on national procedure systems, infra Section I).  Second, it is use-
ful to note the most important substantive law fields in which group
litigation schemes in European countries are utilized (Section II).
Then, I will consider different types of group litigation (Section III)
and certain procedural conclusions that can be drawn from the fore-
going comparative survey (Section IV).  Finally, I will give the pros-
pects for some of the central problems of European group litigation
and for its future development.
I.  GROUP LITIGATION IN EUROPEAN PROCEDURES
The European Directive on Injunctions for the Protection of
Consumers’ Interests presents a very topical background for the
European interest in group litigation and in comparative experiences
Copyright  2001 by Harald Koch.
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1. See Gerhard Walter, Mass Tort Litigation in Germany and Switzerland, 11 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L. L. 369 (2001).
2. See generally Harald Koch, Class and Public Interest Actions in German Law, 4 CIV.
JUST. Q. 66, 66-79 (1986)(explaining class actions under German law); Harald Koch, Group and
Representative Actions in West German Civil Procedure, in GERMAN NATIONAL REPORTS IN
CIVIL LAW MATTERS FOR THE XIIITH CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN MONTRÉAL 27-40
(Erik Jayme ed., 1990).
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with it.3  The implementation of this Directive into national law was
due by the end of 2000.  The Directive’s official title is a misnomer; it
is not so much the injunction remedy that characterizes the Directive,
but rather its procedural enforcement—by assigning rights of action
to “qualified entities,” which are either organizations (e.g., consumer
associations) or independent public bodies (e.g., administrative agen-
cies)—that give it effect.  Hence, even though the group litigation
topic does not appear in the Directive’s title, the associations’ suit is
the most important option the member states have in implementing
the Directive into their national law.
In Germany, the Directive was incorporated in June 2000 into
the Standard Contract Terms Act and the Unfair Competition Act,4
which now provide a right of action for consumer associations (Ver-
bandsklage) that are registered in a list drawn up by the Federal Ad-
ministrative Office and communicated to the EC Commission.  The
German legislature has not yet enacted a comprehensive and consis-
tent law on collective remedies in a general procedural context, de-
spite the recommendations of a number of renowned procedural ex-
perts.5  Rather, the Bundestag was content with a number of partial
and unsystematic supplements and corrections to several consumer
law statutes.6  However, the present Secretary of Justice, on the occa-
sion of the Civil Code’s (BGB) centenary, proposed a complete revi-
sion of the Law of Obligations, which is the part of the BGB that is
under heavy European pressure.  In this context, the introduction of a
more general chapter on collective remedies—either associated with
3. See EUR. PARL. AND COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 98/27, 1998 O.J. (L 166) 51 [hereinafter Di-
rective 98/27/EC].
4. See Gesetz über Fernabsatzverträge und andere Fragen des Verbraucherrechts sowie
zur Umstellung von Vorschriften auf Euro [Statute on Distant-Sales Contracts and Other Con-
sumer Law Questions as well as on Adaption of Regulations to the Euro] v. 26.06.2000, Bun-
desgesetzblatt [hereinafter BGBl.] I p. 897 [hereinafter Statute v. 26.6.2000] (incorporating in
addition the implementation legislation to the EC Distant Selling Directive 97/7/EC, 1997 O. J.
(L 144) 19).
5. See, e.g., Norbert Reich, Diverse Approaches to Consumer Protection Philosophy, 14 J.
CONSUMER POL’Y 257, 279 (1992); Peter Gottwald, Class Action auf Leistung von Schadenser-
satz nach amerikanischem Vorbild im deutschen Zivilprozess? 91 ZEITSCHRIFT FUER
ZIVILPROZESS [ZZP] 1-38 (1978); EIKE VON HIPPEL, VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ (3rd ed. 1987);
Harald Koch, Die Verbandsklage in Europa, 113 ZZP 413, 441 (2000).
6. See Statute v. 26.6.2000 supra note 4, (supplementing the Gesetz zur Regelung des
Rechts der Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen [Standard Contract Terms Act] [hereinafter
AGBG] secs. 13, 22 and the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb [Unfair Competion Act]
[hereinafter UWG] sec. 13).
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consumer provisions of the BGB contract law or as a special proce-
dural statute—is being seriously considered.7
The European Injunction Directive alternatively provides for
one of two different models of collective interest representation prac-
ticed in member states.  The first is the vindication of non-individual,
diffuse, or public interests that can be distinguished from the accu-
mulated interests and rights of individuals.  This is characterized by
Consideration no. 2 of the Directive:
“Whereas current mechanisms . . . for ensuring compliance with
[consumer protection] Directives do not always allow infringements
harmful to the collective interests of consumers to be terminated in
good time; whereas collective interests mean interests which do not
include the cumulation of interests of individuals who have been
harmed by an infringement; whereas this is without prejudice to in-
dividual actions brought by individuals who have been harmed by
an infringement; . . . Parliament and Council have adopted this Di-
rective.”8
This is the model most civil law associations’ suits are following,
and it is concerned primarily with certain substantive interests that
are entrusted to and can be pursued by these associations, such as
consumer protection, competition, or fair contract practices.9
The other model of collective interest representation is group
litigation in the literal sense.  In other words, the representation of a
specifically defined group of adversely affected people that either by
full assignment (contractual or statutory) or partial assignment (for
procedural purposes only) transfers the right of action to the repre-
sentative, a public trustee, or an association.10
Both of these forms of group representation in Europe differ
from American and Canadian class actions in two important ways.
First, there is no method of self-appointment of an individual cham-
7. Cf. the federal government’s proposal for a “Statute modernizing the law of obliga-
tions” (Schuldrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz) Aug. 4, 2000, Art. 3 (pp. 109 et seq.).
8. Council Directive 98/24/EC, Consideration no. 2, 1998 O.J. (L 131) 11.
9. Cf. GROUP ACTIONS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION - L’ ACTION COLLECTIVE ET LA
DEFÉNSE DES CONSOMMATEURS (Thierry Bourgoignie ed., 1992); DIE BÜNDELUNG
GLEICHGERICHTETER INTERESSEN IM PROZESS, (Jürgen Basedow, et. al. eds., 1999); Bryant
Garth, Group Actions in Civil Procedure, in ACADÉMIE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT
COMPARÉ, XIIIE CONGRES INT. DE DROIT COMPARÉ, RAPPORTS GÉNERAUX 205 (Montreal
1990); Catherine Kessedjian, L’Action en Justice des Associations de Consommateurs, RIVISTA
DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 281-300 (1997); Koch, supra note 5,
at 413–442.
10. In Europe, it seems that only England—and to a certain extent the Netherlands—have
accepted this model. See Ellger, Die Bündelung  gleichgerichteter Interessen im englischen Zivil-
prozeß, in Basedow, et. al., supra note 9 at 109 et seq.; Koch, supra note 5, at 425.
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pion (plaintiff) and no concept of an individual private Attorney
General, whose initiative is fostered by fee incentives or by an allur-
ing contingency fee arrangement.  To be sure, this may be well-
deserved because of the risk assumed and the attorney’s hard work;
however, in the European tradition—although this may be slightly
over-simplified—we entrust the public interest to public institutions
rather than to private law enforcers.  By doing so, we must put up
with all of the problems of a poorly-motivated, cumbersome, and
perhaps understaffed bureaucracy, as well as the question of legiti-
macy of representation.  Under such a system, the interests of indi-
vidual victims of unlawful behavior tend to be neglected in larger and
more autonomous organizations.  This is also true for large and
anonymous class actions, but is more of a problem with the Ver-
bandsklage (associations’ suit) where special rules must secure the in-
fluence of those represented (information, res judicata and opt-out,
fair distribution of proceeds, etc.).
There is a second crucial difference between the class action and
the European style collective actions, and that is the latter’s emphasis
on injunctive relief rather than on damages (although in some coun-
tries, damages, especially symbolic and non-material, can also be
sought by an association).11
II.  SUBSTANTIVE LAW FIELDS OF APPLICATION
This Section provides a short survey of the most important sub-
stantive law fields in which group litigation in Europe occurs.  In
Germany, the Verbandsklage is granted a unique and exceptional po-
sition in the doctrine of procedure, as it does not purport to enforce
solely individual, subjective rights, which would be the usual designa-
tion of a civil procedure’s function.  This exceptional status is re-
flected in the lack of a general concept or rule of association action in
civil procedure.  Rather, an association’s right of action is only pro-
vided in some special substantive law contexts, such as certain stat-
utes concerning business self-regulation, consumer protection, labor
law, industrial property, and environmental protection.12
11. For example, in France, Greece and Spain.  See Hans-Jürgen Puttfarken & Nicole
Franke, Die action civile der Verbände in Frankreich; Anastasia Papathoma-Baetge, Die Ver-
bandsklage im Griechischen Recht; Eva-Maria Kieninger, Die Verbandsklage in Spanien, in Ba-
sedow et al., supra note 9; Koch, supra note 5, at 425-426.
12. See Koch, Group and Representative Actions in West German Civil Procedure, supra
note 2, at 28.
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Coming back to the European Injunction Directive, it confines
itself from the outset to consumer protection, and in an annexed
schedule, it lists nine special Directives and indicates those violations
of specific consumer interests that are subjected to injunctive action
made available to independent public institutions or consumer asso-
ciations.  This schedule can be divided into three groups:
 Protection from misleading and perilous advertising
 Certain sales practices such as door-to-door sales or distance
selling
 Unfair contract practices in general and in special fields such
as consumer credit, tourism, and time-sharing contracts.13
This seems to be a narrow scope of application for collective
remedies, and the recent implementation experience in Germany is
not very promising with respect to the introduction of a more general
and progressive concept of group litigation.  But on the other hand,
the momentum the Directive can give to new developments should
not be underestimated.  At the very least, it is recognition of a func-
tion of civil procedure in Europe that to a great extent was previously
denied—its capacity for collective and public interest protection.14
Also, in Article 6 of the Directive, the Commission is obligated to
give a report to Parliament and Counsel after three years, not only on
the experiences, but also on possible extensions of the substantive
scope of application.15
III.  DIFFERENT TYPES OF GROUP LITIGATION
This Section describes the different types of European group ac-
tions, characterized by the kind of relief sought and the interests rep-
resented.
A. Injunctive Relief
As already indicated by the European Directive’s title, the asso-
ciations’ suit generated by the Directive is limited to injunctive relief.
This was true before the Directive came into force in some of the
countries where the associations’ actions had been practiced, such as
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and the Benelux coun-
13. See Directive 98/27/EC, supra note 3.
14. See Reinhard Greger, Verbandsklage und Prozessdogmatik - Neue Entwicklungen in
einer schwiergen Beziehung, 113 ZZP 339 (2000) (for critiques of this “collectivist” develop-
ment).
15. See Directive 98/27/EC, supra note 3.
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tries.  In these countries, the associations’ right of action for an in-
junction is established.16 In some countries, however, this right of ac-
tion exists only in the consumer law area; thus, consumer associations
have standing.  However, in other countries, the right of action is also
assigned to other organizations, such as business federations, unions,
environmental associations, and chambers of commerce.17  This type
of collective action is used for the control and enforcement of compe-
tition and business standards, industrial property rules, environmental
law, etc.  It therefore follows that this remedy is in fact a public inter-
est tool; it pursues the public interest using effective law enforcement,
since the traditional (European) instruments of control and law en-
forcement by administration are insufficient.18
B. Damages Relief
Damages in the traditional civil law perception exist primarily to
compensate the individual victim, whereas the public interest primar-
ily stands for regulation and control and thus focuses on the violator
and effective sanctions.  Because these are two very different objec-
tives, associations’ suits for damages seem incompatible with tradi-
tional concepts of civil liability.  In France and Greece, where associa-
tions’ suits are frequently used for damages relief (see supra note 8),
the notion of damages differs greatly from the idea of an individual
burden to be compensated.  The notion of “dommage collectif” does
not mean the simple accumulation of numerous individual claims, but
rather a nominal, or a non-material, lump-sum that cannot be exactly
calculated and proved; it is used merely for its symbolic meaning (“1
franc symbolique”), as it is usually awarded in the context of criminal
proceedings against the violator.19  Recently, however, the awards in
“actions civiles” brought by associations have become increasingly
larger and sometimes take the character of deterrent or punitive
damages (“peine privée”).20
In Greece, damages are not necessarily afforded to the associa-
tion as they are not conceived as calculable compensation of specific
16. See supra note 6 (for detailed references).  See Koch, supra note 2 (for Germany).
17. See id.
18. See HARALD KOCH, PROZESSFÜHRUNG IM ÖFFENTLICHEN INTERESSE 71 et seq.
(1983); Anne Morin, L’action de’intérêt collectif exercée par les organisations de consommateurs
avant et après la loi du 5 janvier 1988, in Bourgoignie, supra note 9, at 57, 76 et seq. (as to the
comparative evaluation of criminal/administrative and private law enforcement).
19. Puttfarken & Franke, supra note 11, at 174; Morin, supra note 18, at 65.
20. See Puttfarken & Franke, supra note 11, at 176 (for detailed references to French
cases).
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losses.  Rather, the association sues for non-monetary, intangible
losses that are usually awarded in a lump-sum and must be used only
for charitable purposes.  The preventive, sometimes punitive, charac-
ter of this type of action is obvious.21
C. Associations’ Right of Action
Associations suing for a specific group whose members can be
identified represent a completely different constituency.  Here, it is
not the public interest or the substantive or political advantage of a
diffuse fraction of society (such as consumers or environmentalists)
that is vindicated by the association; instead, it is the procedural rep-
resentation of a certain group of claimants whose rights are collected
for purposes of procedural economy.  This can be dealt with by tradi-
tional procedural instruments of representation, such as mandate or
assignment, and therefore does not require special legislation.  Under
these principles, associations could sue for damages even if it is their
members’ claims (assigned to them) that they are asserting.  In mass
tort situations, there is a possibility that an ad-hoc interest group may
represent the members in negotiations and in legal proceedings.  In
Germany, this grouping of numerous claims under the control of an
attorney (or by the court’s initiative) is possible and often used.22
What runs into considerable opposition, however, is the formal and
professional representation of such accumulated claims by an associa-
tion.  An old statute banning non-lawyers from counseling and deal-
ing with legal matters is still zealously used by the organized bar in
order to prevent unethical solicitation of business.23  Under European
rules of freedom of establishment and services, it is doubtful that
such restrictions on offering legal services are still maintainable; the
European Court of Justice seems to be moving in a more and more
liberal direction.24
21. See Papathoma-Baetge, supra note 11, at 201
22. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Supreme Court) [hereinafter BGH] Oct.
27, 1983, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift [hereinafter NJW], (1984), 2220; Rainer Wunderlich,
Zivilprozessuale Möglichkeiten für ein gemeinschaftliches Vorgehen geschädigter Kapitalanleger,
46 DER BETRIEB 2269 (1993); Koch, supra note 2, 4 CIV. J. Q. 66, 74 et seq. (1986).
23. RECHTSBERATUNGSGESETZ [Statute on Legal Counselling] v. 13.12.1935, Reichsge-
setzblatt [RGBl. I p. 1478]. For numerous examples cf. GÜNTER RENNEN & GABRIELE
CALIEBE, RECHTSBERATUNGSGESETZ (3rd ed. 2001), art. 1 § 1.
24. See Case C-3/95, Reisebüro Broede v. Sandker, E.C.R. 6188 (1996) (such tendencies
can be gathered from this case).
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D. Public Rights of Action
Since law enforcement in the civil law tradition is the administra-
tion’s function, it may not come as a surprise that in some countries, it
is primarily public institutions that are granted a right of action in civil
procedure.  The European Injunction Directive provides for a right of
action for “independent public bodies” as an alternative to the asso-
ciations’ suit (art. 3, lit. a), reflecting English and Scandinavian expe-
riences with procedural initiatives that can be taken by independent
agencies or the Ombudsman.  In Scandinavia, the Consumer Om-
budsman is granted a mandate to control illegal and unfair practices
by negotiation, recommendation, or enjoinment, and sometimes even
through the issuance of criminal fines towards illegal businesses.25
The Ombudsman cannot, however, sue for damages.  Although the
Ombudsman tradition is generally considered successful in Scandina-
via, the lack of damages relief may explain why the introduction of a
group action-style class action (“grupptalan”) is being seriously con-
sidered in Sweden (the Lindblom proposal) and in Norway (Norwe-
gian Civil Procedure Commission).26
In England, the Director General of Fair Trading has an inde-
pendent right of action in consumer matters.  It is restricted, however,
to injunctions (sec. 37 of the Fair Trading Act of 1973) and is seldom
used.  This may be due to staff limitations, as well as sufficient extra-
judicial control activities of the Office of Fair Trading.27
Irrespective of the differing national rules, in general there re-
mains serious objection to collective interest representation by the
government; even if an Ombudsman or an agency is formally inde-
pendent and free from government supervision, it will always have to
rely on government funding and therefore its political autonomy
might be limited.
25. See Roberth Nordh, Group Actions in Sweden: Reflections on the Purpose of Civil Liti-
gation, the Need for Reforms, and a Forthcoming Proposal, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 381
(2001).
26. See also Per-Henrik Lindblom, Individual Litigation and Mass Justice: A Swedish Per-
spective and Proposal on Group Actions in Civil Procedure, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 805 - 831 (1997)
(for a perspective on Sweden).
27. See Office of Fair Trading (Britain), 1992 ANNUAL REPORT; Ellger, supra note 10, at
125.
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IV.  PROCEDURAL CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing comparative survey of some European tools for
collective litigation now allows me to draw some procedural conclu-
sions.
A. Damages
First, what are the special problems that Europeans have with
non-injunctive remedies?  The confinement of the European Direc-
tive to injunctive relief may be due to a realistic assessment of the ac-
ceptance of harmonization proposals in the EU.  To be sure, it does
not prevent member states from taking more far-reaching steps in the
process of national implementation of the Directive.28  However, as-
sociations’ suits for true damages (class-action style) are running into
stiff opposition—at least in Germany.29  Proposals are criticized as ad-
vocating deeply socialist reforms; such critiques obviously confuse the
collective—hence efficient—use of procedural tools with socialism!
There are other obstacles that civilians have to overcome if they
are serious about compensating for deficits in effective law enforce-
ment in cases of widespread petty injuries and damages.  The most
important problem is the traditional understanding of damages as a
means of purely compensating the victim (i.e., restoring the victim to
his or her former position).  What is necessary is a change of perspec-
tive towards the regulative and preventive functions of civil liability.
Economists and comparativists have already taught us much about
this change,30 and there are some indications in that direction in the
case law of several European high courts.31
Second, there is the rather narrow notion of special damages that
can only be awarded under European laws, in particular in Germany.
Except for pain and suffering and violation of privacy, there is no
28. See Directive 98/27/EC, supra note 3, art. 7.
29. See Greger, supra note 14, at 411; Klaus Oepen [Bericht uber die Diskussion] report on
the discussion of Koch’s proposals: 113 ZZP 443 et seq. (2000).
30. See, e.g., J. P. Brown, Towards an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEG. ST. 323
(1973); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 163 et seq. (4th ed. 1992); UGO
MATTEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS (1997); see also Schäfer, Anreizwirkung bei der
Class Action und der Verbandsklage, in Basedow et al., supra note 9, at 67 (from a German per-
spective); Gerhard Wagner, Haftung und Versicherung als Instrumente der Techniksteuerung, 50
VERSICHERUNGSRECHT 1441 (1999); Harald Koch, Präventions—und Steuerungswirkung des
Schuld—und Wettbewerbsrechts 19 JURISTENZEITUNG 922, 930 (1999).
31. See, e.g., Cassell and Co. Ltd. v. Broome, H.L. 1027 at 1078 et seq (A. C. 1972) (per
Lord Hailsham, at 1119 per Lord Wilbeforce); BGH 15.11.1994—Caroline of Monaco—NJW,
(1995), 861.
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possibility under German law for non-material damages that cannot
be exactly calculated.32  However, it is possible to estimate material
damages if the effort of ascertaining the exact amount would be un-
reasonable,33 and this could also be used to estimate collective dam-
ages in situations of widespread losses.
Finally, the distribution of a damage award among victims of a
violation is a management-like procedure to which civilian courts are
purportedly ill-accustomed.  What skeptics of any new judicial task
forget is that there is already a field of activity and experience where
courts must often manage the distribution of a fund among numerous
claimants: bankruptcy.  Thus, there are dispositions for a more exten-
sive development of collective remedies already de lege lata.
B. Judicial Certification
Judicial certification and control of representation are additional
procedural tools necessary to prevent the misuse of collective pro-
ceedings.  The EU Directive and its implementing legislation in Ger-
many provides for a certification procedure for an association that
wishes to engage in litigation in the consumer field.34  Such an associa-
tion can only be admitted and registered if it has at least seventy-five
individual members or is a parent organization of other consumer as-
sociations.  The business community in Germany is particularly suspi-
cious of the misuse of the associations’ right of action, and since the
judiciary is afraid of being overwhelmed by too many proceedings
brought by self-appointed champions of the public interest, it has
provided for a general misuse clause in the Unfair Competition Stat-
ute.35  Thus, the courts have the discretion to admit only serious asso-
ciations.
C. Prior Consultation Proceeding
In order to save the courts from premature group demands, the
EU Directive suggests a prior consultation proceeding.36  An associa-
tion that intends to ask for an injunction may start the procedure after
32. See BASIL MARKESINIS, GERMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, VOL. 2: LAW OF TORT (3rd
ed. 1997); GERT BRUEGGEMEIER, PRINZIPIEN DES HAFTUNGSRECHTS 182 et seq. (1999).
33. See, e.g., ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [German Civil Procedure Code] v.12.9.1950, §
287 [BGBl I p. 533] (which gives the court discretionary power to ascertain the origin and
amount of damages).
34. See Directive 98/27/EC supra note 3, art. 4; AGBG sec. 22(a).
35. See UWG § 13 (5).
36. See Directive 98/27/EC supra note 3, art. 5.
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trying to stop the alleged infringement via consultation with the de-
fendant. Germany has not picked up this suggestion because it has
other means of preventing plaintiffs from suing.  These are mainly
cost disadvantages; if the defendant in an early stage of the proceed-
ing recognizes the claim of a plaintiff who failed to demand that the
defendant comply with his obligation, then the costs of the lawsuit
will be charged to the plaintiff, even though he or she won the case.37
D. The Costs of Group Litigation and the Role of Attorneys
This brings us to my final point: the costs of group litigation and
the role of attorneys.  The crucial role that the costs of litigation play
for the significance (or insignificance) of nearly every procedural rule
and arrangement cannot be overemphasized.  It is not necessary in
this context to comment on the importance of attorneys’ fees and
their allotment in damages class actions; however, the “American
rule” and contingency fee arrangements are unknown in Europe and
thus must be considered if we want to learn from each other.  Instead,
I want to sketch very briefly the financing rules in associations’ suits
in some European jurisdictions.
Collective and public interest litigation needs some kind of dis-
charge of the plaintiff’s risk, as the individual plaintiff obviously does
not litigate for his own economic advantage.  The respective cost rules
for most European countries can be arranged in two categories.  The
first is public funding of the associations and their lawyers and/or no
fees for public interest litigation.38  The second is financing “via the
market” or abiding by the European rule of costs (the loser pays prin-
ciple).
However, following this market rule, even in public interest liti-
gation by associations, there could be a major obstacle to the efficient
use of procedural remedies.  In particular, if courts’ expenses and at-
torneys’ fees are calculated by a percentage of the amount in contro-
versy (which is the rule in Germany), the risk involved in losing a case
of great public importance and then having to pay all the costs (in-
cluding the opposing attorneys’ fees) would severely reduce these
semi-public and necessary control activities.  Therefore, in light of the
37. See ZPO § 93.
38. See UWG, § 23 b; MARKENGESETZ [Trademark Act] v. 25.10.1994 § 142 [BGBl I p.
3083]; AKTIENGESETZ [Stock Corporation Act] v. 6.9.1965 § 247 (2) [BGBl. I p. 1089] (in
Germany, consumer associations engaging in litigation are largely publicly funded; other means
of subsidizing public interest litigation include the court’s power to reduce the amount-in-
controversy (which is conclusive for the fees)).
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law enforcement functions served by the associations’ suits, they
should at least be co-financed by public subsidies.  Of course, the as-
sociations’ proceeds from delivering chargeable services, publications,
and tests, as well as from membership dues, could be used as financ-
ing resources as well.39
V.  PROSPECTS
A general appraisal of the prospects of group litigation in Europe
must take into consideration both the European and the member
states’ level of legislation.  The future of group litigation will be dic-
tated by two factors: the demand for more effective enforcement in
certain substantive areas and the demands of the procedural econ-
omy.  Among the most important substantive fields of law covered in
the EU Treaties are environmental and consumer protection.  In
these fields, the need for legal action is considered to be very high,
and since standard behavior and mass phenomena are very common
in both fields, violations of legal rules may lead to widespread injury
and therefore the respective remedies must be adequate.  The policy
programs of the EC Commission in consumer and environmental law
expressly provide for reforms of procedural instruments to more ef-
fectively realize their substantive policy goals.40
The second factor of determination is the demands of procedural
economy, and it is this combination of substantive policy and proce-
dural needs that will force European legislators to invigorate collec-
tive and public interest functions of civil procedure to a much greater
extent than recognized before.  Whether it opts for a class action
model, an association’s suit or another form of public representation
depends largely on procedural traditions in the respective countries
and the political power of organized interests, including the bar and
the judiciary.  It seems that in most continental European countries,
an association’s suit is more easily compatible with traditional princi-
ples of legitimate representation, public responsibility, and proce-
dural economy.  The step to a new procedural dimension, however, is
the extension of all forms of collective proceedings to a damages rem-
edy.  The history of the American Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3) strikingly demonstrates that group litigation becomes a real
39. Cf. Koch, supra, note 5, at 431(my proposals as to that effect).
40. See Greenbook on Consumer Access to Law and Conciliation of Consumer Disputes in
the Internal Market, COM(93)576 final, at 60, 92; Consumer Policy Action Plan, COM(98)696
final, at 21, 22.  See also Greenbook on Civil Liability for Dangerous Products, COM(99)396
final, at 31, 32.
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political and social force for change as soon as it asks for damages and
thus leads to adequate compensation, as well as to perceptible sanc-
tions for wrongdoing.  It is this remedy that makes the class action, as
well as the associations’ suit, a powerful tool for effective law en-
forcement.
